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For centuries, human self-control has fascinated scientists and nonscientists alike. Current theories 
often attribute it to an executive control system. But even though executive control receives a great 
deal of attention across disciplines, most aspects of it are still poorly understood. Many theories rely 
on an ill-defined set of ‘homunculi’ doing jobs like 'response inhibition' or ‘updating’ without explaining 
how they do so. Furthermore, it is not always appreciated that control takes place across different 
time-scales. These two issues hamper major advances. Here we focus on the mechanistic basis for 
the executive control of actions. We propose that at the most basic level, action control depends on 
three cognitive processes: signal detection, action selection, and action execution. These processes 
are modulated via error-correction or outcome-evaluation mechanisms, preparation, and task rules 
maintained in working- and long-term memory. We also consider how executive control of actions 
becomes automatised with practice, and how people develop a control network. Finally, we discuss 
how the application of this unified framework in clinical domains can increase our understanding of 
control deficits and provide a theoretical basis for the development of novel ‘behavioural change’ 
interventions. 
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How the brain adjusts behaviour in ever-
changing environments is an enduring mystery. 
Scientists have attributed adaptive and goal-
directed behaviour to ‘executive control’. This 
umbrella term is used for the functions of the 
cognitive system that allow people to regulate 
their behaviour according to higher-order goals 
or plans. This involves organising, monitoring, 
and altering the settings of lower-level cognitive 
processes such as stimulus detection and motor 
programming (Logan & Gordon, 2001; Miller & 
Cohen, 2001; Monsell & Driver, 2000; Norman & 
Shallice, 1986). These functions are critical in 
everyday life, as they allow us, for example, to 
resist temptations, overcome habits, or replace 
actions when required (e.g. when you are driving 
a car and a pedestrian unexpectedly crosses the 
street). More generally, executive control has 
been linked to physical and mental health, 
school and job success, substance dependence, 
personal finances, and many aspects of social 
behaviour (Diamond, 2013; Moffitt et al., 2011). 
Impairments in executive control may underlie 
many psychopathological disorders, including 
attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, substance 
abuse disorders, eating disorders, obsessive-
compulsive behaviour disorders, and gambling 
disorders (Bechara, Noel, & Crone, 2006; Crews 
& Boettiger, 2009; Garavan & Stout, 2005; Nigg, 
2001; Noël, Brevers, & Bechara, 2013; de Wit, 
2009). The outcome of behavioural change inter‐
ventions has also been linked to executive con‐
trol (e.g. Nederkoorn, Jansen, Mulkens, & 
Jansen, 2007). Thus, it is no surprise that execu‐
tive control is a central component of many neu‐
robiological models of addictions, and of impul‐
sive and compulsive behaviours (Chamberlain & 
Sahakian, 2007; Crews & Boettiger, 2009; 
Dalley, Everitt, & Robbins, 2011; Goldstein & 
Volkow, 2011; Robbins, Gillan, Smith, de Wit, & 
Ersche, 2012). 
In this article, we critically assess the current 
state of the executive control literature and high‐
light some pressing issues. We propose a unified 
framework of executive control, and describe 
how this framework can contribute to our under‐
standing of 'behavioural change' and to the de‐
velopment of new behavioural change interven‐
tions that target eating behaviour, addiction, and 
self-control problems more generally. We focus 
on executive control of actions, but also consider 
how this work could translate to the control of 
thought and emotion.
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An Army Of Control Homunculi
Early research on executive control focused 
mostly on behavioural deficits after frontal-lobe 
lesions (for short reviews, see Miyake et al., 
2000; Monsell & Driver, 2000). The common 
finding is that frontal-lobe patients experience 
problems with organising and regulating actions; 
for example, they can become impulsive, and 
are often unable to respond appropriately to 
changes in the environment. Based on such 
findings, it was proposed that a critical function 
of the frontal cortex is executive control of action 
and thought. After the cognitive revolution 
against the behaviourists in the 1950s, the con‐
cept of an 'executive controller' also became 
very prominent in the cognitive literature. Howev‐
er, in early models of cognition, control was es‐
sentially attributed to a unitary 'homunculus' who 
pulls the levers to regulate lower-level systems 
when needed (Baddeley, 1996). Around the turn 
of the century, many psychologists agreed that 
this situation was no longer tenable, because 
homunculus theories may explain what is con‐
trolled but not how control is exercised. 
The preferred strategy to tackle the ‘how’ 
question became fractionating the executive 
controller and determining how distinct control 
functions regulate behaviour. Monsell and Driver 
(2000) proposed the slogan “Dissolve, decon‐
struct, or fractionate, the executive! Let a hun‐
dred idiots flourish!” (p.7). They argued that to 
know how control is exercised, we should identi‐
fy the very basic processes (the 'army of idiots') 
that underlie control. In the last decade, great 
efforts have been made to deconstruct the exec‐
utive controller. For example, correlational work 
suggests that there is both unity and diversity in 
executive control, with at least three distinct ex‐
ecutive functions: switching between tasks or 
mental sets (‘shifting’), changing and monitoring 
representations stored in working memory (‘up‐
dating’), and suppression of irrelevant informa‐
tion and cancellation of inappropriate actions 
('inhibition') (Miyake et al., 2000). Many studies 
have focused on the cognitive and neural sub‐
strates of these functions and how they interact 
with each other. Unfortunately, we believe that 
this work has not yet succeeded in banishing 
homunculus theories. 
Too often, researchers label cognitive func‐
tions as 'executive' without questioning the 
mechanistic nature of the underlying processes. 
For example, in clinical, social, and cognitive 
psychology, individual or group differences in 
controlling actions are typically attributed to vari‐
ation in the effectiveness of a single control func‐
tion (e.g. 'inhibition'). Similarly, in cognitive neu‐
roscience, prefrontal brain activation when peo‐
ple replace one response with another is often 
assumed to reflect a form of 'executive control'. 
However, the community seems to have fallen 
in to the t rap o f confus ing tasks wi th 
mechanisms. Many processes contribute to suc‐
cessfully replacing an action. By referring to 
general constructs such as 'inhibition' (or even 
worse, 'executive control' or ‘self-control’), we do 
not explain performance in complex environ‐
ments–we merely re-describe it. Thus, although 
many researchers no longer appeal to a single 
control homunculus, control is often attributed to 
an ill-defined set of specialised 'black-box' ho‐
munculi that are assumed to do jobs like 're‐
sponse inhibition' or ‘updating’ without explaining 
how they do so. We believe this theoretical strat‐
egy of focusing on general functions rather than 
the underlying processes is limiting progress on 
the control problem, because in most cases, 
there are no clear explanations for how the spe‐
cific functions are achieved. 
Furthermore, many (if not most) studies fo‐
cus on action control in response to changes in 
the environment. However, various processes 
that take place on different time-scales may con‐
tribute to individual and situational differences in 
the efficacy of control. Preparation or pre-activa‐
tion of subordinate systems that are required to 
detect a specific stimulus (e.g. a red light), to 
select a specific response (e.g. ‘hit the brake 
pedal’), or to execute specific action (e.g. move 
the leg) could have a major influence; similarly, 
the ability to implement and maintain new rules 
may prove critical. Finally, action control may 
evolve over time. The dichotomous distinction 
between 'executive' and 'automatic' processes is 
still omnipresent in the action control literature. 
Automatic processes are considered to be fast, 
associative, emotional, effortless, and easily 
triggered by information in the environment, re‐
gardless of the current task goals. By contrast, 
executive processes are considered to be 
slower, effortful, rational, and goal-directed. But 
these may be the extremes on a continuum, and 
control processes that start off as deliberate and 
effortful can become progressively more ‘auto‐
matic’ through experience. By not properly ac‐
knowledging the contribution of processes such 
as preparation and learning, we generate an 
inherently limited perspective on the cognitive 
mechanisms behind action control. 
Our proposed solution for these interlinked 
issues is a comprehensive theoretical framework 
of action control and adaptive behaviour that 
integrates research from different areas (see 
Figure 1 for a schematic representation). We will 
focus not only on the functions of the cognitive 
control system but also on the underlying cogni‐
tive processes. We define various forms of be‐
havioural control as due to the interplay between 
three basic and computationally well-defined 
processes: signal detection, action selection, and 
action execution. Each process is monitored and 
parameters are adjusted when the outcome is 
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Figure 1: A schematic overview of our framework, which is inspired by Newell’s Unified Theories of 
Cognition (Newell, 1990). We define various forms of behavioural control as an interplay between three 
basic and computationally well-defined processes (signal detection, action selection, and action 
execution), which are regulated and influenced by (sets of) processes that take place on different time 
scales: outcome monitoring, advance preparation, rule acquisition and maintenance, associative 
learning, and development. We propose that the parameters of all three basic processes (detection, 
selection, execution) can be influenced by these other processes. In the main text, we discuss each 
‘box’ in more detail so as to avoid the introduction of new homunculi. 
suboptimal. Furthermore, preparation will directly 
impact on the effectiveness of the selection and 
execution processes. ‘Task rules’, which have to 
be activated and maintained, will constrain the 
processes and adjustments. Finally, we will out‐
line how action control and behavioural change 
gradually becomes automatised through 
practice, and more generally, how a control sys‐
tem can develop. 
From Changes In The Environment To 
Changes In Behaviour
Flexible behaviour is often studied in tasks 
such as the stop-signal paradigm (Logan, 1994; 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2008c), the psychological 
refractory period (PRP) paradigm (Pashler, 1994; 
Welford, 1952), reversal learning paradigms 
(Izquierdo & Jentsch, 2012), Stroop tasks 
(Stroop, 1935), or in one of their many variants 
(e.g. Dodds, Morein-Zamir, & Robbins, 2011; 
Logan & Burkell, 1986; MacLeod, 1991; Mars, 
Piekema, Coles, Hulstijn, & Toni, 2007; Ver‐
bruggen, Aron, Stevens, & Chambers, 2010). 
These tasks often have in common that a new 
action has to be selected in the context of other 
strong action plans (see Table 1 in Appendix for 
a selective overview of key paradigms). Differ‐
ences in dependent variables such as response 
latency and error rates are usually assumed to 
reflect variations in the efficacy of control. For 
example, in most stop-signal task studies (in‐
cluding some of our own earlier work; e.g. Ver‐
bruggen, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2004), 
the stop-signal reaction time (Table 1) is as‐
sumed to reflect the duration of an executively 
controlled inhibition process. However, the stop-
signal reaction time reflects more than the dura‐
tion of an inhibitory process. Indeed, we have 
recently demonstrated how successful inhibition 
of actions depends on the detection of the stop 
s i g n a l a n d t h e s e l e c t i o n o f a ‘ s t o p 
response’ (Verbruggen et al., 2010). In this sec‐
tion, we will further develop our framework of 
how humans can change actions in various situ‐
ations. Based on the seminal work of Sternberg 
(1969) and others, we propose that at the most 
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basic cognitive level, action control involves 
three steps: signal detection, action selection, 
and action execution (their application is illustrat‐
ed in Figure 2).
Signal detection
The first step of replacing a response is 
nearly always detecting the stop or change cue 
(e.g. a traffic light turning red or noticing an un‐
expected obstacle on the road). A failure to de‐
tect the signal in time could have important neg‐
ative consequences. However, the contribution 
of detection processes to executive control of 
action is often neglected.
A convergence of evidence suggests that 
flexible behaviour depends on an interplay be‐
tween two attention networks: a dorsal fron‐
toparietal network that enables the selection of 
sensory stimuli, and a ventral frontoparietal net‐
work that reorients attention to important and 
behaviourally relevant stimuli that appear outside 
the focus of attention (Corbetta & Shulman, 
2002; Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008). The 
dorsal attention network is thought to be involved 
in both stimulus-driven capture (bottom-up) and 
goal-directed processing (top-down) (, 2008). 
Precisely how these modes interact is still in‐
tensely debated (see e.g. Theeuwes, 2010, and 
associated commentaries). The ventral attention 
network is believed to be critical for behavioural 
flexibility as it allows reorienting attention from 
one stimulus or task towards another. Even 
though this network is primarily involved in stimu‐
lus-driven attention, it is activated more by weak 
behaviourally relevant stimuli than by salient 
behaviourally irrelevant stimuli (Corbetta et al., 
2008). This suggests that the detection of novel 
signals is constrained or biased by top-down 
control mechanisms. For example, target detec‐
tion could be controlled by an ‘attentional tem‐
plate’ (a representation of the relevant target or 
target features, such as red circle) that biases 
competition between sensory inputs that com‐
pete for processing resources and control of 
behaviour (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Duncan, 
2006). Computational work has shown how the 
templates could influence processing in both 
ventral and dorsal streams (Deco & Rolls, 2005). 
Pre-activation of neurons in sensory areas that 
code for specific stimulus features (e.g. location, 
colour, shape) could be the neural implementa‐
tion of the templates (Deco & Rolls, 2005; 
Stokes & Duncan, 2013). 
We believe that the literature on attention 
should become more integrated with the action-
control literature. After all, signal detection is an 
important component of executive control of 
action: If changes in the environment are not 
detected quickly, this will have robust down‐
stream effects on action control. Salinas and 
Stanford (2013) demonstrated that countermand‐
ing (i.e. cancelling or stopping) eye movements 
primarily depends on the outcome of a rapid 
sensory detection process. Based on their com‐
putational work, they suggested that most ma‐
nipulations in the countermanding task, which 
requires subjects to cancel eye movements 
(Table 1), cause changes in perceptual process‐
es rather than inhibitory processes per se. The 
role of stimulus-detection or cue-encoding pro‐
cesses goes beyond action-reprogramming 
paradigms such as the countermanding task. 
Some models of interference control in 
paradigms such as the Eriksen flanker task 
(Table 1), focus on the role of spatial attention 
(e.g. Cohen, Servan-Schreiber, & McClelland, 
1992). In the task-switching literature (Table 1), 
authors have argued that the cost associated 
with alternating between tasks is at least partly 
due to cue-encoding processes (Logan & Bunde‐
sen, 2003; Monsell & Mizon, 2006). Consistent 
with this idea, rule-switch performance in a card-
sorting task in children was improved when the 
relevant stimulus dimensions were salient, sug‐
gesting a bottom-up attentional influence on 
flexible behaviour (Fisher, 2011).
Thus, we suggest that rapid detection of 
cues or changes in the environment is key to 
replacing planned or ongoing actions, and that at 
least some individual or situational differences in 
action control can be attributed to the efficacy of 
stimulus detection. While signal detection may 
seem effortless, it does require a delicate bal‐
ance between selective attention and change 
detection: focusing on a given stimulus may lead 
to overly rigid behaviour while the constant reori‐
enting of attention to novel stimuli would lead to 
constant distraction.
Action selection
When a change signal or cue is detected, an 
appropriate alternative action has to be selected. 
Sequential sampling models have provided a 
popular theoretical framework for action selec‐
tion and decision-making because they explicate 
the various steps involved (Brown & Heathcote, 
2008; Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Smith & Ratcliff, 
2004). The main assumption of these models is 
that action selection and decision-making involve 
the accumulation of noisy information about stim‐
uli in the environment (Figure 2). Noise is 
present both in the environment (e.g. visibility 
may be reduced or the environment may be 
cluttered) and in the cognitive system (e.g. neu‐
rons may fire randomly and different processes 
may be happening at the same time), so deci‐
sion-making involves collecting evidence until 
there is enough support for an option. More for‐
mally, accumulation of information in response 
counters, which keep track of the collected evi‐
dence, starts when a stimulus is detected1. In 
each situation, there may be different response 
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options; one of them is selected when the accu‐
mulated evidence in favour of it reaches a cer‐
tain threshold (Figure 2). This response option is 
then executed. The more noisy the information 
(e.g. because the stimulus is perceptually de‐
graded), the longer it will take to reach the 
threshold. This will result in longer reaction 
times, and often, lower accuracy. This accumula‐
tion to threshold may resemble patterns of activi‐
ty in certain neurons (Purcell et al., 2010; Wang, 
2013). The main parameters of the selection 
process are the response criteria (i.e. how much 
information is required for a response to be se‐
lected; this is represented by the distance be‐
tween the horizontal lines in Figure 2) and accu‐
mulation rate (how quickly does the information 
accumulate; this is represented by the slope of 
the tilted lines in Figure 2). Variations in these 
parameters can account for phenomena such as 
impulsive decision-making and choice errors 
(Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Smith & Ratcliff, 2004), 
and sequential sampling models have been suc‐
cessfully applied to a range of decision-making 
tasks and to different clinical and non-clinical 
populations (White, Ratcliff, Vasey, & McKoon, 
2010). 
These sequential sampling models have 
been applied mostly to simple decision-making 
tasks in which subjects have to select a single 
response. But we propose that similar principles 
underlie the selection of actions in the context of 
stopping, countermanding, or replacing actions. 
Sequential sampling models have already been 
applied successful ly to countermanding 
(Boucher, Palmeri, Logan, & Schall, 2007; Sali‐
nas & Stanford, 2013) and stop-signal tasks 
(Logan, Van Zandt, Verbruggen, & Wagenmak‐
ers, 2013). Boucher et al.’s model included a 
single go accumulator and a single stop accumu‐
lator, with two processing stages, namely ‘encod‐
ing’ of the countermanding signal and ‘interrup‐
tion’ of the go process. An eye movement was 
successfully countermanded if stop information 
had accumulated quickly enough to suppress 
(via mutual inhibitory connections) information in 
the go unit and prevent it from reaching a thresh‐
old. Salinas and Stanford (2013) developed a 
similar rise-to-threshold model, but did not make 
any mechanistic assumptions about inhibitory 
activity; as mentioned above, they showed that 
perceptual processes and deceleration of infor‐
mation accumulation was sufficient to account 
for many aspects of performance. These two 
models had only one go accumulator. More re‐
cently, a sampling model with multiple go accu‐
mulators and a single stop accumulator has 
been developed to account for stopping in situa‐
tions in which multiple go responses are possible 
(Logan et al., 2013). This model could account 
well for both choice and stop behaviour.
In the context of behavioural change, alter‐
native actions must often be selected in competi‐
tion with more dominant or already activated 
actions. Existing models could easily be modified 
to account for this. It has been proposed that 
there may be an asymmetry in mutual inhibition 
of units (Boucher et al., 2007) or top-down bias‐
ing of response options (Cohen, Dunbar, & Mc‐
Clelland, 1990). More specifically, the mutual 
inhibition account assumes that different re‐
sponse options suppress each other. In Figure 2, 
when evidence for the ‘carrot’ option accumu‐
lates, this would suppress accumulation of evi‐
dence for the ‘crisps’ option. Boucher et al. sug‐
gested that there may be an asymmetry in mutu‐
al inhibition, so that one response option (e.g. 
the carrot) may suppress the other response 
option (e.g. the crisp) more. The biasing account 
assumes that information accumulation is biased 
(e.g. by decreasing the distance between the 
starting  point and the threshold; see Figure 2), 
making the selection of certain alternatives more 
likely. Others have proposed that selection of 
non-dominant actions is achieved by global sup‐
pression of all motor output to allow for informa‐
tion accumulation in the counter of the non-domi‐
nant action (Frank, 2006; Wiecki & Frank, 2013). 
The global suppression account overlaps with 
the ‘circuit breaker’ account of attention, which 
proposes that when unexpected, salient signals 
are detected, ongoing processes are ‘automati‐
cally’ interrupted to allow the cognitive system to 
process the new incoming information (Corbetta 
& Shulman, 2002; Corbetta et al., 2008). 
The computational work suggests that similar 
selection mechanisms may be used in various 
situations. Cognitive neuroscience studies fur‐
ther support this idea. Mid-dorsolateral and ven‐
trolateral prefrontal areas are recruited by tasks 
that require selection of competing actions 
(Bunge, 2004; Duncan & Owen, 2000), and stim‐
ulation of these areas influences action selection 
in different situations. We have found that mag‐
netic stimulation of subregions within the right 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex can influence at‐
tentional and action selection not only in a stop-
signal task, but also in a double-response task in 
which participants occasionally had to execute a 
secondary response in addition to the originally 
planned response (Verbruggen et al., 2010). 
Similarly, Buch and colleagues demonstrated 
that stimulation of the ventral premotor cortex 
(adjacent to the posterior ventrolateral prefrontal 
cortex) influenced both selection and reprogram‐
ming of actions: immediately after presentation 
of the initial stimulus, stimulation of this area 
increased motor cortex excitability; however, the 
same stimulation reduced motor excitability 
when reprogramming was required (Buch, Mars, 
Boorman, & Rushworth, 2010). This context-
dependent effect of brain stimulation is consis‐
EXECUTIVE CONTROL OF ACTIONS 6
tent with the idea that similar mechanisms are 
involved in both programming and reprogram‐
ming actions, with the main difference being the 
output of the selection process (see also Mars et 
al., 2007). Based on these and similar findings, 
we propose that various forms of action control 
not only serve the common goal of behavioural 
change, they also rely on an overlapping set of 
selection processes (see also Mostofsky & Sim‐
monds, 2008).
More generally, we propose that action se‐
lection and stimulus detection are governed by 
similar principles. The ‘biased competition’ ac‐
count of visual attention assumes that there is 
competition between sources of information at 
many (if not all) processing stages; the main role 
of attention is to resolve this competition by bias‐
ing specific sources of information or specific 
features (Desimone & Duncan, 1995). Similar 
top-down bias signals can resolve competition 
between action options or allow the selection of 
non-dominant actions (see also Chun, Golomb, 
& Turk-Browne, 2011).
Action execution
When a response is selected or a decision 
has been made, the appropriate action must be 
executed. There can be a relatively long delay 
between choosing (or deciding) and acting 
(Schall, 2001) because a ‘motor program’ has to 
be created when an action is selected. Keele 
defined a motor program as ‘a set of muscle 
commands that are structured before a move‐
ment sequence begins, and that allows the entire 
sequence to be carried out uninfluenced by pe‐
ripheral feedback’ (Keele, 1968, p.387). Creating 
such programs after an action is selected may 
contribute to the delay between choosing and 
acting. Consequently, the execution phase could 
be a final stage where individual or situational 
differences in action control arise. Motor control 
is a research area in itself, and we will not at‐
tempt to review this literature here. We will only 
focus briefly on three topics that are closely 
linked to executive control, namely the extent to 
which motor programs can be altered or can‐
celled once initiated, how they are controlled 
after the action is executed, and how the motor 
system interacts with the cognitive system.
If a motor program contains all the informa‐
tion needed to carry out the action, no extra con‐
trol is required to complete the desired move‐
ment. This does not imply that movements can 
no longer be altered. In the literature on action 
control, researchers often make a distinction 
between controlled stages, which could be influ‐
enced by executive control, and ballistic stages, 
which must run to completion once initiated. The 
boundary between these two stages is called the 
‘point-of-no-return’. The stop-signal literature 
suggests that the ballistic stages must be very 
brief (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b). This idea is 
supported by both mathematical analyses and 
studies that showed that subjects could still in‐
hibit responses that had already produced elec‐
trical activity in muscles (see Verbruggen & Lo‐
gan, 2009, for a review). Thus, movements can 
be prepared without being executed (Schall, 
2001). Not only can planned movements be 
cancelled, they can also be adjusted quickly if 
needed (e.g. Schmitz, Jenmalm, Ehrsson, & 
Forssberg, 2005). Thus, motor programs can still 
be terminated or altered quickly if new informa‐
tion becomes available. 
Once the action has been completed, a ‘re‐
set’ signal may be required to restart evidence-
accumulation processes and suppress motor 
activity to prevent the re-execution of the same 
response. Indeed, in many computational mod‐
els, such a reset is required to stop the system 
settling into a loop.  In Logan and Gordon’s Ex‐
ecutive Control of Theory of Visual Attention 
(ECTVA) model, the executive system was re‐
sponsible for this reset signal (Logan & Gordon, 
2001).  Note that there may be an overlap with 
the proactive suppression account discussed 
below, which proposes that people suppress 
motor activity to prevent premature responses. 
In our framework, action execution is preced‐
ed by signal detection and action selection pro‐
cesses. This does not imply that action execution 
cannot interact with the preceding stages. First, 
an action can ‘create’ a signal for the next deci‐
sion. To achieve certain goals, multiple move‐
ments may be required. In some situations, 
these movements could be ‘chunked’ or com‐
bined during the decision stage, when different 
options are selected simultaneously. But chunk‐
ing may not always be possible (or preferable), 
so after each individual movement is completed, 
a new decision is required based on the imposed 
changes in the environment. This process would 
continue until the desired state or goal is 
achieved (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960). 
Second, the dual-task literature suggests that 
output modality has a direct influence on the 
decisional phase. Huestegge and Koch (2013) 
showed that saccades were prioritised over man‐
ual responses when participants had to make 
two decisions at the same time. This ‘response-
modality dominance pattern’ could be the equiv‐
alent of the ‘visual-modality dominance’ pattern 
observed at the stimulus stage (i.e. visual modal‐
ity often dominates the auditory modality when 
different stimuli are presented; see Huestegge & 
Koch, 2013). The combination of input and out‐
put modalities also influences task performance 
in dual-task situations (for a short review, see 
Huestegge & Hazeltine, 2011). For example, the 
dual-task cost, which is often observed in multi‐
task situations (Table 1), disappears after suffi‐
cient practice for some input-output combina‐
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tions (e.g. an auditory input and a vocal output) 
but not for others (e.g. visual input and verbal 
output). This suggests that selecting an action is 
not only influenced by the input, but also by the 
output and the input-output pairing. More gener‐
ally, this shows that there may be a close link 
between the cognitive and motor systems, which 
goes beyond the cognitive system instructing the 
motor system which actions to perform.
Interim key points: 
‒ Researchers should provide a more detailed 
account of action control because the cur‐
rent focus on general functions hampers 
theoretical and practical progress.
‒ We propose a framework that describes 
three cognitive processes underlying most 
forms of action control: signal detection, ac‐
tion selection, and action execution. Each 
process can be conceived as a biased com‐
petition between alternatives.  
‒ Individual or situational differences can arise 
at each stage, which further highlights the 
need for a detailed framework. 
Beyond online action control
We have outlined the core of our framework, 
and have illustrated how replacing an action 
depends on the detection of change signals, 
selection of an action, and the execution of that 
action. The detection and selection stages in‐
volve a biased competition between sources of 
information and response alternatives. In the 
following sections, we will focus on how these 
biases are continuously adjusted by processes 
that take place across different time scales. We 
propose that detection, selection, and execution, 
are influenced by monitoring, preparation, task 
rules maintained in memory, associative 
learning, and developmental changes (Figure 1). 
Combined, these processes lead to flexible and 
highly adaptive behaviour. In Figure 1, each 
component is depicted by a box. In the following 
sections, we will further unpack each box, creat‐
ing our ‘army of idiots’ (Monsell & Driver, 2000). 
Learning From Mistakes Or Unexpected 
Outcomes
Many things can go wrong when people try 
to execute a novel action. People may confuse 
stimuli at the detection stage, they may select 
the incorrect response, or they may execute the 
selected response incorrectly. Even when no 
mistakes are made, the outcome of an action 
may be less desirable than anticipated. Monitor‐
ing and feedback loops are a critical component 
of most accounts of coordinated behaviour 
(Ullsperger, Danielmeier, & Jocham, 2014). With‐
in the executive control and decision-making 
literature, there are several detailed neuro-com‐
putational models of outcome monitoring and 
how this influences subsequent detection, selec‐
tion, and execution processes. Three popular 
classes of explanation are the confl ict-
monitoring, error-monitoring, and outcome-evalu‐
ation accounts.
The conflict-monitoring account of Botvinick 
and colleagues (Botvinick, 2007; Botvinick, 
Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001) assumes 
that the anterior cingulate cortex, a brain area 
located in the medial frontal cortex, monitors for 
the occurrence of conflict between various re‐
sponse options. This brain region is often activat‐
ed in situations in which prepotent responses 
have to be suppressed, situations in which one 
out of many possible but equally strong actions 
must be selected, situations in which errors are 
likely to occur, and situations with unfavourable 
outcomes. Based on these findings, Botvinick et 
al. proposed that the anterior cingulate cortex 
computes a ‘conflict signal’. Conflict can be de‐
fined computationally as the simultaneous acti‐
vation of incompatible stimulus (Egner, 2008; 
Verbruggen, Notebaert, Liefooghe, & Vandieren‐
donck, 2006) or response representations 
(Botvinick et al., 2001). When a conflict signal is 
generated, task-relevant attentional or action 
pathways are biased, reducing the likelihood of 
errors or conflict on subsequent trials (Botvinick, 
2007; Botvinick et al., 2001). For example, Egner 
and Hirsh (2005) examined control adjustments 
in a picture-word Stroop task. On each trial, an 
irrelevant word was superimposed on a task-
relevant face. They found that activation in the 
fusiform face area, a brain area that responds 
strongly to face stimuli, was increased after trials 
on which there was competition between the 
face and word stimuli. This is consistent with the 
idea that conflict-monitoring processes bias the 
competition between various sources of informa‐
tion, enhancing detection of task-relevant stimuli 
and selection of task-appropriate responses.  
Others have stressed the role of anterior 
cingulate cortex in error-driven learning and 
computing the likelihood of errors (Brown & 
Braver, 2005). Brown and Braver showed how 
variability in a single error-learning parameter 
could account for individual differences in risk 
aversion and in the brain’s response to response 
conflict, error likelihood, or error consequences 
(Brown & Braver, 2008). Despite the differences, 
the conflict- and error-monitoring accounts stress 
that a critical aspect of optimal action control is 
the ability to monitor ongoing cognitive process‐
es.
Outcome-evaluation models in the decision-
making and reinforcement learning literature 
assume that actions can be associated with a 
value, which represents a prediction concerning 
future reward. After every action, the cognitive 
system compares the obtained reward with the 
expected reward. After reward is obtained, the 
action values are updated: when the reward or 
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Figure 2: Action selection without a homunculus. We propose that action control involves three critical 
steps: signal detection, action selection, and action execution. We propose that both detection and 
selection can be modelled as accumulation of information towards a threshold (the dashed horizontal 
line). When stimuli are presented (in this example, the crisps and carrot), accumulation in the 
perceptual system starts, and a stimulus is perceptually encoded and attended (‘signal detection’) 
when the evidence reaches a certain threshold. When an item is encoded, evidence for possible 
actions starts to accumulate (‘action selection’), and a response is selected when one of the thresh‐
olds is reached. Then this response is executed. In this example, the ‘eat the carrot’ threshold is 
reached first, so the person would eat the carrot. Note that for simplicity, we depict linear ballistic 
accumulators (Brown & Heathcote, 2008).
outcome is better than expected, the strength of 
the selected action is strengthened (‘reinforced’); 
when the outcome is worse than expected, the 
value is decreased and the action is less likely to 
be selected again in similar future situations 
(Botvinick, Niv, & Barto, 2009; e.g. Frank & 
Badre, 2012). In other words, outcome-evalua‐
tion modulates action-selection biases, and this 
will influence how quickly information for the 
preferred response option will accumulate and 
reach the decision threshold (see above). Some 
have argued that value can be attached to 
sources of information as well, influencing stimu‐
lus detection processes (Gottlieb & Balan, 2010). 
Note that outcome evaluation and conflict/error-
monitoring could be two sides of the same coin 
(Botvinick, 2007). Indeed, conflict or choice er‐
rors could be construed as aversive events, and 
therefore to be avoided in the future (, 2007), 
and activation of the anterior cingulate cortex 
has been linked to encoding the relationship 
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between an action and the reinforcement value 
of its outcome (Rushworth, Walton, Kennerley, & 
Bannerman, 2004, p.412). Ridderinkhof, 
Ullsperger, Crone, and Nieuwenhuis (2004) sug‐
gested that a single mechanism that signals the 
likelihood of obtaining a reward could account for 
many findings in reward-learning and conflict/
error-detection literature.
Interim key points: 
‒ Adaptive behaviour requires monitoring or 
evaluating the outcome of actions.
‒ Detection, selection and execution biases 
are continuously adjusted as a result of the 
monitoring process. This will determine how 
quickly a stimulus is detected and how 
quickly an action is selected or executed in 
the future. 
Action Control As A Prepared Reflex
The work discussed so far may suggest that 
executive control is primarily ‘reactive’: it is only 
ac
tio
n
ex
ec
ut
io
n
ac
tio
n 
se
le
ct
io
n
si
gn
al
 
de
te
ct
io
n
st
im
ul
us
in
pu
t
ev
id
en
ce
 fo
r 
ea
tin
g 
cr
is
ps
ev
id
en
ce
 fo
r 
ea
tin
g 
ca
rr
ot
pe
rc
ep
tu
al
ev
id
en
ce
 fo
r 
cr
is
ps
pe
rc
ep
tu
al
ev
id
en
ce
 fo
r 
ca
rr
ot
EXECUTIVE CONTROL OF ACTIONS 9
when something changes or when something 
goes wrong, that the control system would ‘kick 
in’. However, in many situations, we do not wait 
for unexpected events to happen. Indeed, we 
can adjust our behaviour ‘proactively’. In contrast 
to the ‘online’ or ‘reactive’ control processes 
discussed above, proactive control refers to con‐
trol processes in anticipation of an event. Proac‐
tive control can involve many things, including 
preparing oneself to detect a stimulus or cue, 
activating specific action plans, temporarily ad‐
justing decision thresholds, and suppressing 
motor output to prevent premature responses 
(Verbruggen & Logan, 2009c). Thus, the three 
basic components of our framework may be 
influenced by preparation.
Humans can 'proactively' allocate attention. 
For example: in the classic Posner cuing 
paradigm (Posner, 1980), detection of a stimulus 
is enhanced by providing a central cue (e.g. an 
arrow) that directs attention to a specific location 
(e.g. the left of the screen). This has been linked 
to anticipatory activity in visual cortex (Kastner & 
Ungerleider, 2000; Luck, Chelazzi, Hillyard, & 
Desimone, 1997; Sylvester, Shulman, Jack, & 
Corbetta, 2007). Detection of stimuli or cues may 
also be enhanced by advance information of 
other features, such as shape, colour, or direc‐
tion of motion (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). Non-
spatial preparatory attention is also associated 
with sustained activity in sensory areas 
(Chelazzi, Duncan, Miller, & Desimone, 1998). 
Such an increase in baseline activity will lead to 
an increased probability that the system will se‐
lect the stimulus that matches the attentional 
template. Thus, proactively adjusting attentional 
settings can enhance detection of task-relevant 
features (especially when perceptual information 
is weak), and reduce interference caused by no-
longer relevant features (Braver, Gray, & 
Burgess, 2007). Consistent with the latter idea, 
we have demonstrated that goal-directed cueing 
of the target location reduced the effect of dis‐
tractors that flanked a target (Klemen, Ver‐
bruggen, Skelton, & Chambers, 2011).
Proactive action selection or movement 
preparation is also possible. For example, stud‐
ies using a pre-cuing procedure demonstrated 
that individual motor actions or sets of actions 
can be prepared or 'primed' in advance (Rosen‐
baum, 1980; Rosenbaum & Kornblum, 1982). 
This could reduce the time required to create 
motor programs. Similar to attentional cueing 
effects, motor priming may be linked to anticipa‐
tory activation of the motor network via associa‐
tions between the cue and action options. This 
will bias the selection and generally reduce the 
response time when a stimulus is presented 
(Meyer & Kieras, 1997). Consistent with this 
‘biased selection’ idea, computational modelling 
has shown that cuing the probability of a re‐
sponse or the potential payoff for a specific re‐
sponse, reduces the amount of information re‐
quired to select the more probable response or 
the response associated with higher reward 
(Mulder, Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Boekel, & 
Forstmann, 2012). Priming of a non-habitual 
response could also increase the probability of 
selecting this action in the context of other more 
habitual actions, or when little information is 
available. Note that in some situations people 
may proactively suppress a specific action or set 
of actions to prevent the premature execution of 
a response (Cai, Oldenkamp, & Aron, 2011; Claf‐
fey, Sheldon, Stinear, Verbruggen, & Aron, 2010; 
Criaud, Wardak, Ben Hamed, Ballanger, & 
Boulinguez, 2012; Duque, Labruna, Verset, Olivi‐
er, & Ivry, 2012). Computational work by Lo and 
colleagues suggests that in a countermanding 
task, the stopping network is activated even 
when no stop signal is presented (Lo, Boucher, 
Paré, Schall, & Wang, 2009). Thus, inhibitory 
motor control in stop-signal and countermanding 
tasks may be largely proactive in nature because 
it depends on control adjustments and network 
dynamics before a stop signal is presented (see 
also Wang, 2013, p.238).
Proactive control could potentially lead to a 
'prepared' or 'intention-based reflex'. Some years 
ago, one of the authors (IPLM) of this article was 
planning to turn into a road on his bike. A car 
was waiting to turn into the same road on the 
opposite side of the street IPLM was travelling 
along. IPLM had priority as the car would cut 
across his path. IPLM made a clear signal with 
his extended arm just before he was about to 
turn. Unexpectedly, the car then immediately 
executed its manoeuvre, with the result that it 
knocked IPLM off his bike as he went around the 
corner. Why did this happen? We propose that 
when attention is proactively allocated and re‐
sponses are prepared, goal-directed actions may 
not require much control anymore (Hommel, 
2000; Logan, 1978; Meiran, Cole, & Braver, 
2012); instead, actions could be activated easily 
by stimuli in the environment, even when they 
are inappropriate. Thus, when the car driver had 
prepared the response of turning to a high de‐
gree, IPLM’s signal with the arm may have fur‐
ther primed the prepared reflex to the point 
where it exceeded threshold and was implement‐
ed as an action2.
Logan (1978) demonstrated in a series of 
experiments that most stages in a visual-search 
task (including detection and response-selection) 
remained relatively unaffected by a concurrent 
load. He concluded that the preparation before 
the stimulus appeared was effortful, but respond‐
ing was reflexive: 'the components of the task 
seem automatic, but the task itself is not' (Logan, 
1978, p.57). Similarly, Woodman, Luck, and 
Schall (2007) demonstrated that a visual 
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working-memory load interfered with visual 
search only when the visual target changed from 
trial to trial. These findings suggest that stimulus 
detection, response selection, and execution 
may require little extra top-down support when 
correct task rules are properly activated. Further‐
more, studies that have demonstrated that the 
preparation can even interfere with task-relevant 
or appropriate behaviour (see also the bicycle 
anecdote) provide further support for the ‘pre‐
pared reflex’ idea. Subjects are more likely to 
shift spatial attention to a task-irrelevant distrac‐
tor when it matches a feature of the attentional 
template (Chun et al., 2011). Similarly, respons‐
es can be activated via instructed but unprac‐
tised stimulus-response mappings even when 
these mappings are task irrelevant (Cohen-
Kdoshay & Meiran, 2009); however, such effects 
are only observed when the tasks are actually 
prepared and participants anticipate that they 
have to perform them in the near future 
(Liefooghe, De Houwer, & Wenke, 2013). Finally, 
we have found that the irrelevant distractor 
'STOP' inside a go stimulus interfered with re‐
sponding in stop-signal and go/no-go tasks but 
not in a task where participants could always 
respond (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). These 
findings are consistent with the prepared reflex 
idea: the prepared action can be triggered by 
irrelevant primes, even when this is not strictly 
required (, 2009a).
Combined, this work suggests that action 
control could be reflexive; paradoxically, this 
could even lead to a cost in some situations. But 
usually the main costs associated with proactive 
control are that this strategy requires highly reli‐
able predictive contextual cues, it is metabolical‐
ly costly, and it is capacity demanding (Braver et 
al., 2007). Humans usually prefer to avoid cogni‐
tive demands (Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & 
Botvinick, 2010), so internal costs may shift the 
balance between reactive and proactive control 
(McGuire & Botvinick, 2010). This also implies 
that a proactive strategy is less likely to be ap‐
plied in situations with very long retention inter‐
vals between a 'warning' cue and the stimulus, 
as this may require too much effort. Finally, 
strong pre-activation of stimulus features or ac‐
tions may also stand in the way of flexible be‐
haviour in ever-changing environments. Thus, a 
delicate balance between proactive and reactive 
control is required. 
The costs associated with proactive control 
could potentially explain some individual and 
situational variation. Differences in motivation 
(Leotti & Wager, 2010) and emotional factors 
(Fröber & Dreisbach, 2012) contribute to intra-
individual differences in deployment of proactive 
control, and factors such as reward sensitivity, 
general intelligence, and working-memory ca‐
pacity may cause inter-individual differences 
(Braver, 2012; Redick & Engle, 2011). Several 
studies have also shown group differences. 
Healthy young adults seem to rely more on 
proactive control than both young children (Mu‐
nakata, Snyder, & Chatham, 2012) and older 
adults (Paxton, Barch, Racine, & Braver, 2008), 
and proactive control seems impaired in disor‐
ders such as schizophrenia, Alzheimer, ADHD, 
and bipolar disorder (for review, see Braver, 
2012), and in individuals who engage in delin‐
quent and antisocial behaviours (Iselin & De‐
coster, 2009). These findings suggest that at 
least some 'control' deficits could be due to a 
failure to activate the control system proactively. 
Interestingly, training older adults on a proactive 
control task caused a shift from reactive to 
proactive control (Braver, Paxton, Locke, & 
Barch, 2009), suggesting that control strategies 
are amendable. 
Interim key points:
‒ Executive control of actions is often 
proactive: the act of control takes place be‐
fore the change or control signal is present‐
ed.
‒ When control is applied proactively, signal 
detection, action selection, and action exe‐
cution can become a ‘prepared’ reflex, easily 
triggered by information in the environment. 
‒ Important intra- and inter-individual differ‐
ences could be due to shifts from proactive 
to reactive control. 
Activation And Maintenance Of Action Goals 
And Rules
An important issue that we have not ad‐
dressed so far is how the connections between 
input, action selection, and action execution are 
established. And how does the cognitive system 
'know' which stimulus feature or response option 
to bias? The main important advance of the 
(mathematical) modelling framework discussed 
above is that ongoing processes are described in 
detail. However, there is still a ‘homunculus’ 
lurking: because it is the researcher who creates 
all the connections and sets up the relevant ac‐
cumulators that enable a model to perform a 
certain task. Thus, this framework does not nec‐
essarily solve the problem of how the model 
could achieve this functionality in the first place. 
Most theoretical frameworks or models of execu‐
tive control, including our framework, either ex‐
plicitly or implicitly rely on 'rules' (Bunge, 2004; 
Logan & Gordon, 2001; Miller & Cohen, 2001; 
Monsell & Driver, 2000). Rules enable humans to 
quickly select relevant cues or stimulus features, 
map sensory input to action plans, and produce 
the motor output. Furthermore, sequential adjust‐
ments after a trial (see e.g. Hazeltine, Lightman, 
Schwarb, & Schumacher, 2011) and proactive 
control before a trial are also rule-dependent. 
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Thus, one could argue that rules are at the core 
of executive control. In this section, we will ex‐
plore how rules are activated and maintained. 
We make an explicit distinction between a task 
goal and a task rule: A task goal describes what 
one tries to achieve, a task rule specify how one 
can achieve it. A goal will activate a rule (or set 
of rules). We will primarily focus on the role of 
task rules. 
A key characteristic of adaptive human be‐
haviour is the ability to rapidly learn action rules 
from instructions. For example, if instructed to 
tap your right foot whenever you see the symbol 
'x' on this page, most likely you will be able to do 
this without any practice (even though you have 
probably never done this specific task in your 
life). Recently, several studies have focused on 
the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying 
this fundamental ability. For a complete overview 
of this instruction-based learning literature, we 
direct the interested reader to two recent review 
articles (Cole, Laurent, & Stocco, 2013; Wolfen‐
steller & Ruge, 2012); the review of Cole et al. 
also addresses the issue of language in rule-
learning and control (see also Oberauer, 2009). 
The compositional account of instruction-based 
learning (Cole et al., 2013) is based on five relat‐
ed principles: (1) Compositionality, which refers 
to the ability to reuse representations with a vari‐
ety of other representations; (2) Immediate trans‐
fer, which refers to the ability to apply practiced 
rules to novel situations; (3) Abstraction, which 
refers to the ability to group specific representa‐
tions; (4) Analogy, which refers to the ability to 
recognise similarities; and (5) Compositional 
hierarchy, which refers to creating a structure in 
which more abstract representations modulate 
more concrete stimulus-action representations. 
Of these five principles, compositionality is key, 
as this can offer an elegant explanation for our 
remarkable ability to immediately perform tasks 
that we have never done before. Returning to the 
foot-tapping example, you may never have 
tapped your foot when you saw an 'x' on a page, 
but you may have tapped your foot in response 
to other cues (e.g. music) and you may have 
searched for a specific word or letter string in a 
text before; by linking these representations, you 
are able to perform the new x-tapping task. In 
other words, you would reuse and recombine 
existing circuits, structures or representations 
(see also Anderson, 2010). Support for the com‐
positional theory and other relevant findings are 
discussed in Cole et al. (2013).
There are large individual differences in the 
ability to follow new task rules. The ability may 
be linked to fluid intelligence (Duncan, Schramm, 
Thompson, & Dumontheil, 2012). Furthermore, 
patients with lesions to the lateral prefrontal cor‐
tex may not always be able to produce the in‐
structed behaviour even though they can under‐
stand the instructions (Cole et al., 2013). Duncan 
and colleagues (Duncan, Emslie, Williams, John‐
son, & Freer, 1996; Duncan, Johnson, Swales, & 
Freer, 1997) have referred to this phenomenon 
as 'goal neglect'. Verbal instructions specify an 
abstract 'requirement' (e.g. 'if X then tap right 
foot'), but these requirements have to be imple‐
mented or transferred to procedural working 
memory (Duncan et al., 2012; Logan & Gordon, 
2001; Oberauer, 2009). For example, relevant 
stimulus information, response options, and out‐
put modalities should become ‘biased’, and con‐
texts in which the rules are relevant specified. A 
failure to do so would lead to goal neglect (Dun‐
can et al., 1996; Duncan et al., 1997). 
When instructions are successfully imple‐
mented, rules have to be maintained. We have 
argued above there is sustained activity in brain 
areas that process task-relevant information, 
which biases the selection of information. Rules 
likely provide the top-down signal for this bias 
(Miller & Cohen, 2001; Stokes & Duncan, 2013). 
The popular account is that rules are maintained 
in working memory via persistent firing of stimu‐
lus-specific neurons in the prefrontal cortex (Cur‐
tis & D'Esposito, 2003). More generally, this per‐
sistent firing would allow temporal integration of 
information, which is required for many functions, 
including working memory and the calculation of 
reward rate (Curtis & Lee, 2010). However, re‐
cent findings challenge this ‘persistent activation’ 
account (Postle, 2013; Stokes & Duncan, 2013). 
For example, Stokes and colleagues (2013) 
showed that the presentation of an instruction 
cue triggers a sequence of high-activity patterns 
before settling into a stable low-activity state. 
They proposed that, rather than sustained activi‐
ty, synaptic weight changes constitute the task-
dependent rules that determine how people re‐
spond to stimuli (Stokes & Duncan, 2013). One 
of the main challenges is to further determine 
how rules are maintained in long-term and short-
term memory. 
Finally, in many situations, people have to 
switch between rules. This fundamental ability is 
studied in the task-switching paradigm (for re‐
views, see Kiesel et al., 2010; Monsell, 2003; 
Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 
2010). Switching from one rule to another is 
usually associated with a performance cost. 
Most agree that this switch cost reflects the time 
needed to encode the task cues, activate the 
appropriate task rules, and resolve interference 
caused by previous trials, although the extent to 
which each process contributes to the overall 
switch cost may vary. Cue encoding and task 
reconfiguration are time-consuming processes, 
so performance generally improves when these 
processes can be completed before the stimulus 
appears (Logan & Gordon, 2001; Mayr & Kliegl, 
2000; Meiran, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). 
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This demonstrates the close link between prepa‐
ration and rule activation/maintenance. However, 
not everybody agrees that people always have to 
switch or update rules when tasks change. Lo‐
gan and colleagues argued that switching be‐
tween tasks could be achieved via the retrieval 
of learned associations between cues, stimuli, 
and responses (Logan & Bundesen, 2003; 
Schneider & Logan, 2005), although this idea 
remains highly controversial (e.g. Forrest, Elch‐
lepp, Monsell, & McLaren, 2012; Jost, Mayr, & 
Rösler, 2008; Monsell & Mizon, 2006). In other 
words, they argued that ‘control’ could be asso‐
ciatively mediated. 
Interim key points: 
‒ In our framework, rules constrain perfor‐
mance by providing a top-down bias for each 
process.  
‒ We argue that the ability to follow novel in‐
structions and implement new rules is 
strongly rooted in the past: humans con‐
stantly re-use and recombine old rules that 
have previously governed behaviour. 
Action Control As An Associatively Learned 
Reflex
Historically, executive control has been pitted 
against automatic operations. Often, functions 
such as response inhibition, interference control, 
or task switching have been classified as ‘execu‐
tive’, whereas other processes, such as word 
reading in the context of a Stroop task, have 
been classified as ‘automatic’. In this section, we 
discuss how ‘executive’ processes may also 
become automatic as a consequence of practice. 
It is well documented that responding to a 
stimulus or cue can become 'automatised' over 
practice (Dickinson, 1985; Logan, 1988; Schnei‐
der & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). 
Shiffrin and Schneider proposed that when a 
stimulus and a response are consistently 
mapped, associations are formed, allowing ac‐
tions to become automatic (Schneider & Shiffrin, 
1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Similarly, Lo‐
gan (1988) suggested that every time people 
respond to a stimulus, processing episodes are 
stored. These episodes consist of the stimulus 
(e.g. '3'), the interpretation given to a stimulus 
(e.g. 'odd'), the task goal ('odd/even task'), and 
the response ('left'), are stored. When the stimu‐
lus is repeated, previous processing episodes 
are retrieved, facilitating performance if the stim‐
ulus-response (S-R) mapping is consistent. Re‐
cently, we have demonstrated that more complex 
forms of action control could also become ‘au‐
tomatised’. We found that pairing a stimulus with 
stopping interfered with responding to these 
stimuli (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a), even after 
a single stop presentation (Verbruggen & Logan, 
2008b; Verbruggen, Logan, Liefooghe, & 
Vandierendonck, 2008). We attributed the be‐
havioural slowing for old stop items to the re‐
trieval of stimulus-stop associations, which would 
automatically suppress responding. Similar asso‐
ciatively-mediated ‘control’ effects have been 
observed in other executive control tasks. The 
task-switching literature suggests that stimuli can 
become associated with 'tasks' or 'rules' (Koch & 
Allport, 2006; Mayr & Bryck, 2005; Waszak, 
Hommel, & Allport, 2003). For example, the re‐
sults of Mayr and Bryck (2005) suggest that ab‐
stract spatial translation rules can become inte‐
grated with lower-level stimulus and response 
codes; similarly, the results of Waszak and col‐
leagues suggest that individual stimuli can be‐
come associated with higher-order task-repre‐
sentations, such as 'picture naming' (Waszak et 
al., 2003). Finally, several studies have shown 
that stimuli in tasks such as the Stroop paradigm 
can become associated with attentional control 
settings (Bugg & Crump, 2012). Based on these 
findings, we argue that rule-based action control 
can also become a 'learned reflex', triggered 
even when it is not required or intended at a 
given moment (cf. Meiran et al., 2012; Tzelgov, 
1997; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a)
We suggest that there are four non-mutually 
exclusive ways that associative learning could 
influence action control: (1) conditioned attention 
towards (or away from) the cues, (2) associative‐
ly mediated activation of previously non-domi‐
nant responses, (3) associatively mediated acti‐
vation of abstract rule representations, and (4) 
by changing the hedonic and/or incentive value 
of stimuli.
First, associative learning could influence 
attentional selection. For example, Le Pelley, 
Beesley, and Griffiths (2011) have found that 
subjects looked more at cues experienced as 
predictive of the outcomes with which they were 
paired, than to cues experienced as non-predic‐
tive. Similarly, Gottlieb and Balan (2010) re‐
viewed a single-cell recording study that showed 
higher sustained lateral intraparietal area (LIP) 
activation for predictive cues in a Pavlovian task, 
and suggested that attentional selection is influ‐
enced by the information value of the stimuli. 
These results are consistent with the attentional 
model of associative learning proposed by Mack‐
intosh (Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Mackintosh, 
2010). However, Hogarth and colleagues (Hoga‐
rth, Dickinson, Austin, Brown, & Duka, 2008) 
have found that participants looked more at par‐
tially predictive signals in some situations, which 
is consistent with the Pearce-Hall model of 
Pavlovian learning (Pearce & Hall, 1980; Pearce 
& Mackintosh, 2010). Even though there is un‐
certainty about the direction of the effects, it is 
clear that attention and associative learning can 
interact (albeit in various ways), and the model of 
Mackintosh and Pearce integrates earlier ac‐
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counts to reflect this (, 2010). In other words, 
attention can become ‘conditioned’ (McLaren, 
Wills, & Graham, 2010): attention is paid to stim‐
uli as a consequence of past associative history, 
rather than because of their match with our cur‐
rent goals. This is also supported by some 
event-related potential studies. For example, 
Wills and colleagues have demonstrated that 
early attentional components were modulated by 
associative learning (Wills, Lavric, Croft, & Hodg‐
son, 2007). In a similar vein, ERP work reviewed 
by Woodman suggests that top-down biasing of 
visual attention is only required when targets are 
new, with long-term memory taking over when 
objects are repeated (Woodman, 2013). 
Second, a non-habitual response could be‐
come habitual after sufficient practice (Dickinson, 
1985; Logan, 1988; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; 
Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). This would further 
reduce the need for top-down biasing; after suffi‐
cient practice, the need for top-down biasing 
may even disappear altogether and people 
would no longer have to rely on rules or PFC 
representations to execute an action that was 
initially non-dominant. This idea is supported by 
the work discussed above, and by the finding 
that neural activation in prefrontal and other con‐
trol-related brain regions is reduced after prac‐
tice with consistent mappings (Chein & Schnei‐
der, 2005). 
Third, the studies discussed above suggest 
that during practice, stimuli can become associ‐
ated with task goals or the task rules that bias 
attentional or action selection. After practice, the 
goal or rule representations may become activat‐
ed when a stimulus is repeated, whether this is 
intended or not; this would then influence subor‐
dinate processing. The stimulus-rule association 
idea could explain why repeating an old stop 
stimulus activates components of the stopping 
network in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 
(Lenartowicz, Verbruggen, Logan, & Poldrack, 
2011), or why naming the word inside a picture-
word Stroop stimulus is impaired when this stim‐
ulus was previously encountered in a picture-
naming task (Waszak et al., 2003). Note that 
such stimulus-task effects were observed even 
when the response (e.g. a left key press) was 
the same in both tasks (Koch & Allport, 2006; 
Waszak et al., 2003). The main difference with 
the previous two options is that this third option 
assumes that rule-like representations that bias 
ongoing selection processes are still involved. In 
other words, this third option provides a more 
indirect route to associative control of action. 
However, a possible advantage of this route is 
that this form of learning might generalise better 
to novel situations. We are currently testing this 
idea in our lab. Note that in the associative-learn‐
ing literature, there is an ongoing debate as to 
whether learning associations between a stimu‐
lus and an action is rule-based or based on the 
formation of specific stimulus-response associa‐
tions (see e.g. McLaren et al., 2013a; Mitchell, 
De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). Even though this 
is speculative, one could hypothesise that in our 
framework similar learning mechanisms underlie 
rule-based behaviour and stimulus-response 
link-based behaviour. The main difference be‐
tween the two is the kind of representation that is 
linked with the stimulus: an abstract, rule-like 
representation (X–‘if x then left’), or more con‐
crete stimulus-response associations (X–left).
Finally, stimulus-specific learning may also 
have a more indirect impact on action control via 
a link with the outcome-evaluation processes 
discussed above. Veling, Holland, and van Knip‐
penberg (2008) have shown that consistently 
pairing stimuli with the act of withholding a re‐
sponse results in devaluation of stimuli that were 
initially rated as positive. Similar devaluation 
effects have been observed in other studies (for 
a short overview, see Ferrey, Frischen, & 
Fenske, 2012; Kiss, Raymond, Westoby, Nobre, 
& Eimer, 2008). Furthermore, no-go training 
cannot only reduce the subjective hedonic value 
of erotic images, it may also reduce the motiva‐
tional incentive of such stimuli. Ferrey et al. 
(2012) found that participants were less willing to 
invest time and effort (measured by the number 
of key presses participants were willing to exe‐
cute) to view images similar to the ones paired 
with no-go cues. The link between associative 
learning and value is also supported by the find‐
ing that learning stimulus-go associations hap‐
pens faster in a reward condition than in a pun‐
ishment condition; by contrast, stimulus/no-go 
associations are learned faster in the punish‐
ment condition (Cavanagh, Eisenberg, Guitart-
Masip, Huys, & Frank, 2013; Guitart-Masip et al., 
2012). Thus, there may be a 'hard-wired' Pavlo‐
vian bias that couples reward with approach 
('go') and punishment with avoidance ('nogo') 
(Cavanagh et al., 2013; Guitart-Masip et al., 
2012). Note that the value of items could also be 
modulated associatively via associations be‐
tween stimuli. Wimmer and Shohamy (2012) 
demonstrated that the delivery of reward for a 
specific item can spread to associated items 
stored in long-term memory. In other words, the 
value of unrewarded items was modulated via 
associations with rewarded items. This phe‐
nomenon could explain how people can quickly 
decide between items that they have never seen 
before. 
In combination, the work above suggests 
how changing behaviour can become automa‐
tised. However, work on extinction learning indi‐
cates that some associatively mediated forms of 
action control may be context-dependent (in 
contrast to rule-based action control which 
seems context-independent; see above). In 
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Pavlovian learning, extinction occurs when a 
stimulus that was originally paired with an event 
is repeatedly presented alone; in instrumental 
learning, extinction occurs when an action that 
was originally paired with a reward, is no longer 
reinforced. In both cases, learned behaviour 
typically declines, but the originally learned be‐
haviour often returns when the context changes 
(Bouton & Woods, 2008). This suggests that 
extinction learning is context-dependent. Thus, 
even though automatisation may lead to more 
efficient action control, it does come with certain 
limitations. 
Interim key points: 
‒ Action control can become a ‘learned’ reflex: 
replacing dominant actions initially requires 
top-down bias but could gradually become 
automatised, with the need for top-down bias 
disappearing altogether.  
‒ Associative learning can influence action 
control by modulating each processing step 
in our framework (i.e. signal detection, action 
selection, action execution).
‒ We hypothesise that similar learning mecha‐
nisms underlie both rule-based and stimulus-
response link-based behaviour. 
The Development Of An Action Control 
Network
We argued above that a key characteristic of 
flexible human behaviour is the ability to imple‐
ment new rules quickly, and we proposed that 
this feat can be achieved by reusing or recom‐
bining existing representations or rules (i.e. the 
‘compositionality’ idea). But in our quest to abol‐
ish the control homunculus from theories of ac‐
tion control, we need to address one final issue: 
how does the ‘control repertoire’, or the set of 
basic rules and control processes, initially devel‐
op? 
Learning of rules and abstract 
representations. 
Little research has been done on how rules 
for complex actions are initially acquired (Collins 
& Frank, 2013). Basic reinforcement learning 
accounts can explain how people acquire simple 
stimulus-action rules. A central assumption of 
these accounts is that simple rules are learned 
via exploration of the environment: when a stim‐
ulus is presented, one can try different courses 
of action (e.g. pressing a button on a new piece 
of equipment) and subsequently monitor the 
outcome of the chosen actions. Each time a 
particular action in response to the presentation 
of a stimulus leads to a positive outcome, the 
strength of the action increases, and eventually, 
simple rule-like structures develop. As argued 
above, stimuli and responses can also become 
‘paired’ via error-driven and Hebbian associative 
learning mechanisms. Error-correction learning 
mechanisms try to reduce the discrepancy be‐
tween the predicted outcome and the actual 
outcome (McLaren et al., 2013b), whereas 
Hebb’s learning rule states that ‘cells that fire 
together bind together’. However, basic rein‐
forcement and associative learning accounts 
struggle to explain more complex goal-directed 
behaviour in environments in which multiple 
stimuli or stimulus features (e.g. colour or shape) 
can be attended to and in which many actions 
can be selected. 
One of the harder questions in psychology is 
how, starting with a set of basic associative- or 
reinforcement-learning processes, it might be 
possible to deploy them so as to arrive at a sys‐
tem capable of propositional reasoning. In other 
words, how can we go from associations to 
rules? There have been some successful at‐
tempts to integrate basic learning and rule acqui‐
sition. For example, Rougier and colleagues 
(2005) developed a neurologically inspired com‐
putational model of 'rule' learning. The model 
was trained to respond to multi-dimensional stim‐
uli. In each block, only one dimension was rele‐
vant (e.g. colour). Across trials, the specific fea‐
tures within a dimension changed (e.g. red, 
green, yellow), but activity in the prefrontal cortex 
was maintained due to a gating mechanism 
(Hazy, Frank, & O'reilly, 2007). As a result, the 
PFC system developed patterns of activity that 
encoded abstract representations of the relevant 
stimulus-dimension (e.g. ‘colour’). These ab‐
stract rule-like representations subsequently 
guided behaviour by providing 'top-down' excita‐
tory support for the relevant stimulus dimension 
in the subordinate processing levels (cf. biased 
competition). The biasing was possible because 
links between the abstract representations and 
the processing layers were built during training. 
Thus, the model produced flexible rule-like be‐
haviour without 'biologically problematic symbolic 
processing computations' (Rougier et al., 2005, 
p. 7343). After sufficient training, the model was 
also able to respond correctly to stimuli it had not 
seen before. This generalisation correlated 
strongly with development of abstract represen‐
tations. By contrast, models without the PFC 
system, such as the associative simple recurrent 
network (SRN) model (Elman, 1990), had to 
learn specific stimulus-response combinations, 
and these did not generalise well to novel situa‐
tions. 
The latter result is consistent with findings of 
Spiegel and McLaren (2006). Humans and the 
recurrent network model were trained on a task 
in which they had to respond to the location of 
circles on a computer screen. In the experimen‐
tal group, trial sequences always had a specific 
structure (e.g. ABB(varying numbers of Cs)BBA; 
the letters represent three possible locations of 
the circles). Over a series of experiments, it was 
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demonstrated that the network model used all 
the structure available to develop simple rule-like 
representations. This resulted in faster and more 
accurate responses. These representations al‐
lowed some generalisation to novel situations 
(hence they were rule-like). However, generalisa‐
tion was imperfect because the model was sen‐
sitive to seemingly inconsequential departures 
from the initial structure. This was very similar to 
the behaviour of humans in these experiments 
when they were unaware of the contingencies in 
play. However, under some conditions, humans 
were able to induce the rule as programmed by 
the experimenters (e.g. ‘always as many Bs 
before as after the Cs’), and in these instances 
generalisation was near perfect. The recurrent 
network model was never able to do this. This 
suggests that rule learning in humans comes 
about as the result of a more complex system 
with many interacting parts. Nevertheless, the 
finding that a simple associative network is able 
to develop basic rules (albeit imperfectly) further 
supports the idea that basic associative or rein‐
forcement mechanisms may indeed underlie rule 
learning. Consistent with this, Ramamoorthy and 
Verguts (2012) recently developed a computa‐
tional model of instruction following which relied 
on basic Hebbian learning processes (see 
above) in prefrontal cortex ( see also e.g. Deco & 
Rolls, 2005).  
If we assume that we begin with reward- or 
error-driven associative learning processes, then 
we believe that in order to be capable of devel‐
oping rule-like representations, these processes 
will need to be embedded in an architecture that 
must, at a minimum, be complex (by which we 
mean multi-layer or more than one layer of 
weights), non-linear (so that the multiple layers 
are not simply equivalent to a single layer; see 
Minsky & Parert, 1969) and recursive (so that the 
system can, in principle, compute any com‐
putable function). Obviously the learning algo‐
rithm used will have to be capable of operating 
within this framework (for an example of such an 
algorithm, see Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 
1986). In essence, then, we propose that asso‐
ciative processes within a sufficiently rich and 
complex architecture can deliver the possibility of 
rule-based (symbolic) computation. But even if 
all these requirements are met there is still much 
to be done. It will be the interaction of that sys‐
tem with the world that will allow this develop‐
ment to take place. The architecture and learning 
algorithms, which have evolved throughout hu‐
man evolution, merely confer the potential for 
rule-based processing; the potential has to be 
realised in the course of experience, and so the 
transition from association to cognition is also a 
developmental issue.
In sum, we believe that a key to behavioural 
flexibility is the development of abstract repre‐
sentations via basic learning mechanisms. 
These representations will guide or ‘contextu‐
alise’ stimulus detection, action selection, and 
action execution (Badre, Kayser, & D'Esposito, 
2010; Collins & Frank, 2013; see also e.g. Frank 
& Badre, 2012), and allow generalisation to nov‐
el situations (see also Forrest et al., 2012). Even 
though these models were used to simulate rela‐
tively straightforward rule-based behaviour, the 
general principles are likely to apply to more 
complex situations (Rougier et al., 2005). In 
complex environments, the agent may make 
'temporal abstractions': grouping together a set 
of interrelated actions ('options' or 'policies') 
(Botvinick, 2012; Botvinick et al., 2009). These 
policies can be learned and selected via the 
same reinforcement-based learning mechanisms 
discussed above. When a policy is selected (e.g. 
‘making coffee’), the more 'primitive' motor ac‐
tions are produced based on the acquired lower-
level stimulus-action associations (see e.g. 
Botvinick, 2012, for an accessible discussion).
Development: Building a network for the 
future. 
Major changes in rule-based action control 
take place during childhood. Indeed, the ability of 
children to regulate their behaviour improves 
remarkably from infancy through adolescence 
(for recent reviews, see e.g. Bunge & Crone, 
2009; Bunge, Mackey, & Whitaker, 2009; Dia‐
mond, 2013). Such changes have been linked to 
development of executive control functions and 
the protracted development of the prefrontal 
control network (Bunge & O'Hare, 2012).
Developmental changes in rule-based action 
control throughout early and late development 
can be linked to a shift from concrete stimulus-
action associations to abstract rule-like represen‐
tations (Bunge & Zelazo, 2006; Munakata et al., 
2012). Initially, young children would learn simple 
stimulus-action associations via exploration ('if I 
push this button, a light turns on'), automatic 
imitation, or deliberate demonstration by others. 
These associations then become the 'building 
blocks' for the rule-based control network, and 
shape the development of more abstract repre‐
sentations that constrain and regulate other on‐
going processes. Indeed, Rougier et al. (2005) 
found that concrete stimulus-response represen‐
tations (in posterior brain systems) had to sta‐
bilise before abstract rule-like representations 
could be extracted.
Several studies support the transition ac‐
count. For example, young children are influ‐
enced more by specific stimulus-response asso‐
ciations than adults when switching between 
tasks (Crone, Bunge, van der Molen, & Rid‐
derinkhof, 2006). Furthermore, Kharitonova and 
Munakata (2011) have demonstrated that in 3-
year-old children, flexible rule use in a card-sort‐
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ing test correlated with performance in an ab‐
straction test that required children to select the 
odd-one-out based on an overarching category. 
They suggested that this link could be explained 
by a common underlying working memory mech‐
anism that supports rule-like abstraction and 
perceptually-based abstraction (see also Collins 
& Frank, 2013). In other words, abstraction un‐
derlies flexibility. 
In addition to changes in the ability to devel‐
op abstract rule-like representations, children 
may also develop an ability to generate 'temporal 
abstractions'. Botvinick et al. (2009) noted that 
throughout development, action control becomes 
more hierarchical, with simple actions or rules 
becoming integrated within larger wholes or 
structures. Similarly, Bunge and Zelazo (2006) 
reviewed a series of studies suggesting that 
development of cognitive control was associated 
with an increased ability to represent hierarchies 
of rules in which higher-order rules (cf. 'policies') 
operate on lower-order rules.
To conclude, Thompson-Schill et al. (2009) 
proposed that protracted development of the 
executive prefrontal network is necessary to 
allow children to learn linguistic and social con‐
ventions. Here, we propose that learning neces‐
sarily precedes executive control because learn‐
ing has to provide the building blocks for a 'con‐
trol repertoire' based on abstraction first.
Interim key points: 
‒ Our framework places learning of increasing‐
ly abstract representations at the heart of 
executive control.
‒ Only through constant interaction with their 
environment can people build up a control 
repertoire that will underlie all forms of rule-
based behaviour. 
‒ This repertoire continues to develop through‐
out the life-span.
Implications For Behavioural Change
Clinical disorders often have many origins; 
alterations of cognitive processes may be one of 
them. Therefore, we believe that our framework 
can be applied in clinical domains to increase 
our understanding of certain control deficits and 
provide a theoretical basis for the development 
of novel ‘behavioural change’ interventions. 
Just as in the cognitive and neuroscience 
domain, attribution of control to convenient con‐
trol homunculi is still very present in the clinical 
and more applied domains. Most clinical and 
neurobiological models that rely on executive 
control lack a precise description of the underly‐
ing cognitive components and mechanisms. We 
have argued that a failure to change behaviour 
could have multiple origins. Thus, merely de‐
scribing a deficit or phenomenon as a deficit of 
'inhibition' or 'executive control' does not provide 
an explanation, and discourages discussion of 
alternative theories. For instance, poor stopping 
performance in adults with ADHD may be partly 
due to inattention (Bekker et al., 2005). Many 
studies have observed stopping deficits in chil‐
dren and adults with ADHD, which has led re‐
searchers to suggest that poor response inhibi‐
tion is central to their deficit (Lijffijt, Kenemans, 
Verbaten, & van Engeland, 2005; Lipszyc & 
Schachar, 2010; Nigg, 2001). However, Bekker 
et al. found using event-related potentials 
(ERPs) that an early attention-related component 
(the N1, which is a negative-going ERP compo‐
nent observed 80-120 ms after the presentation 
of an auditory stop signal) was larger for suc‐
cessful stop trials than for unsuccessful stop 
trials in the control group. This finding suggests 
that perceptual attention contributes to stopping. 
This difference in N1 was absent in adults with 
ADHD, which suggests that stopping deficits in 
adults with ADHD are not entirely due to defi‐
ciencies in inhibition but also to deficiencies in 
stimulus detection. Similarly, Brown and Braver 
(2008) have argued that the failure to suppress 
risky and inappropriate behaviour in addictions 
could stem from a failure to adjust performance 
after learning (for a similar idea, see e.g. Gara‐
van & Stout, 2005). These studies indicate that 
focusing on basic processes provides a more 
detailed account of control deficits in e.g. be‐
havioural and substance addictions. This may 
lead not only to important new insights in the 
aetiology of various disorders characterised as 
deficits in changing behaviour, but also to the 
development of strategies for treating these con‐
ditions. Indeed, a common critique is that the 
effective mechanisms of most behavioural treat‐
ments are still underspecified (Toneatto & Lado‐
ceur, 2003). Therefore, providing a detailed ac‐
count of action control deficits could stimulate 
the development of new theory-driven be‐
havioural treatments. For example, it could lead 
to personalised interventions: Person A and Per‐
son B may both have 'stopping' deficits with dif‐
ferent origins, so the intervention for Person A 
could e.g. focus on biasing attention (e.g. in 
adults with ADHD; see e.g. Bekker et al., 2005), 
whereas the intervention for Person B could e.g. 
focus on performance monitoring and control 
adjustments (in e.g. substance abusers; see e.g. 
Garavan & Stout, 2005).
The work on proactive control suggests that 
preparation could lead to a prepared reflex, mak‐
ing action control less susceptible to the negative 
effects of concurrent load (Logan, 1978). This is 
consistent with findings in the 'implementation 
intention' literature (Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer 
& Sheeran, 2006; Gollwitzer, Gawrilow, & Oettin‐
gen, 2010). Implementation intentions refer to 
the linking of critical situations or cues to specific 
actions (e.g. 'Whenever I see a red light on a 
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food item, I will not buy it'). This could lead to a 
prepared reflex; indeed, Gollwitzer noted that 
after implementation intentions are formed, 'ac‐
tion initiation becomes swift, efficient, and does 
not require conscious intent' (Gollwitzer, 1999, p. 
495). Others have argued that forming imple‐
mentation intentions leads to increased monitor‐
ing for cues (see Rummel, Einstein, & Rampey, 
2012, for a discussion), but this is still consistent 
with the proactive control idea discussed above. 
Importantly, implementation intentions, and con‐
sequently, proactive control, could have a posi‐
tive impact on behaviour (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 
2006; Gollwitzer et al., 2010). For example, they 
reduce the negative impact of stress on rule-
based action control (Scholz et al., 2009), pre‐
sumably because less reactive control is re‐
quired. They may also strengthen the effects of 
commercial weight loss programs (Luszczynska, 
Sobczyk, & Abraham, 2007) and reduce binge-
drinking (Hagger et al., 2012). Thus, an avenue 
for future research is how proactive control can 
be used in treatments, bearing in mind that there 
are certain costs associated with it (as discussed 
above). 
It is also important to understand how people 
develop and use new rules. For example, super‐
markets in the UK recently started using a traffic-
light labelling system to indicate sugar, fat, salt, 
and calorie-contents of food items. But how do 
people use this new system to replace their 
favourite (but unhealthy) food item with a more 
healthy option? The work on rule learning, and in 
particular, generalisation and abstraction, dis‐
cussed above could provide some clues. For 
example, it suggests that new rules that are 
based on previously acquired rules (e.g. red light 
= stop) might be learned more quickly (and con‐
sequently, be more effective). The ability to form 
abstract rules may also lead to generalisation of 
control across domains. Recent work from our 
lab suggests that preparing to stop a motor re‐
sponse can result in more cautious decision-
making in a gambling task (Verbruggen, Adams, 
& Chambers, 2012). We are currently exploring 
the mechanisms behind this transfer, but it is 
possible that this effect is caused by proactive 
control: Having the abstract stop rule activated 
could have biased monetary decision-making. 
More generally, we agree with Munakata et al. 
(2012), among others, that abstraction may ex‐
plain executive-control training effects in 
children. Executive control training may work 
better in children with low self-control than in 
adults with low self-control (Berkman, Graham, & 
Fisher, 2012). A better understanding of how 
rules are developed would lead to more effective 
training. Even though this is highly speculative, 
building abstract rule-like representations may 
also provide an explanation for some more id‐
iosyncratic transfer effects, such as the positive 
effect of avoiding sweets or regularly squeezing 
a handgrip in a two-week training period on stop 
performance afterwards (Muraven, 2010), or the 
differential effect of open vs. skilled sports on 
stopping (Wang et al., 2013), or other inhibitory 
spill-over effects (e.g. Berkman, Burklund, & 
Lieberman, 2009). As proposed by the composi‐
tional account, people may recycle or recombine 
rules that they used in other situations; building 
up a control repertoire in one domain could 
therefore lead to improved performance in other 
apparently non-related domains as long as the 
acquired representations are abstract enough. 
Finally, associatively-mediated action control 
could open the avenue for new treatments. Sev‐
eral recent studies have already shown that 
learning to stop motor responses towards food- 
or alcohol-related stimuli influences food and 
alcohol intake both inside and outside the lab. 
For example, several studies have found that 
consistent pairing of food-related pictures to 
stopping in a go/no-go or stop-signal-paradigm 
reduced subsequent food consumpt ion 
(Houben, 2011; Houben & Jansen, 2011; 
Lawrence, Verbruggen, Adams, & Chambers, 
2013; Veling, Aarts, & Papies, 2011; Veling, 
Aarts, & Stroebe, 2012). Furthermore, a similar 
procedure with alcohol-related stimuli reduced 
the hedonic value of alcohol and the subsequent 
weekly alcohol intake of heavy drinking students 
(Houben, Havermans, Nederkoorn, & Jansen, 
2012). Wiers et al. found that a similar avoidance 
training task influenced treatment outcomes in 
alcoholics a year later (Wiers, Eberl, Rinck, 
Becker, & Lindenmeyer, 2011). Finally, Jones 
and Field found that stimulus-specific stop train‐
ing reduced alcohol-intake in the laboratory but 
not self-reported drinking in the week after train‐
ing (Jones & Field, 2013). In combination, these 
results suggest that go/no-go, avoidance or stop-
signal training can influence approach behaviour 
towards a range of stimuli, possibly by changing 
attitudes towards these stimuli or by creating 
non-respond (avoid) associations. People may 
also associatively learn to direct their attention 
either towards or away from stimuli. Recent 
meta-analyses suggest that attentional-bias 
modification could be used in treatments for 
anxiety (Hakamata et al., 2010), although the 
effect may be more modest than initially suggest‐
ed (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011). Several studies 
have also examined attentional-bias modification 
in addiction. This could involve training people to 
redirect attention away from drug-related cues 
towards more neutral cues (Wiers, Gladwin, 
Hofmann, Salemink, & Ridderinkhof, 2013). The 
effectiveness of this training on addiction is still 
unclear. For example, a single session of atten‐
tional bias modification did not influence subjec‐
tive craving or behavioural measures of tobacco 
seeking in cigarette smokers (Field, Duka, Tyler, 
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& Schoenmakers, 2009). Approach/avoidance or 
stop/no-go training may be more effective be‐
cause several aspects of inappropriate be‐
haviour can be influenced at the same time. 
Indeed, avoidance or stop/no-go training could 
influence hedonistic value, motivational be‐
haviour (approach vs. avoidance), and possibly 
even attention towards the stimuli. Preliminary 
data from studies inspired by the framework 
presented here suggest that subjects may learn 
associations between the go stimulus and the 
stop signal, enhancing detection of the latter. 
However, much more research is needed to 
examine how well various forms inhibitory and 
executive-control training can influence be‐
haviour outside the lab (see also e.g. Jones, 
Christiansen, Nederkoorn, Houben, & Field, 
2013). This work will also have to address the 
context-dependence issue (Bouton & Woods, 
2008). 
Final Thoughts And Conclusions
We have discussed how action control can 
be attributed to the interplay between three basic 
cognitive processes: signal detection, action 
selection, and action execution. These process‐
es are constantly adjusted and biased via ab‐
stract representations that develop slowly but 
that can be generalised to different contexts. 
These representat ions support fl exible 
behaviour. At the same time, more concrete stim‐
ulus-action outcome associations are learned, 
which can result in automatisation of actions that 
were initially regulated by the ‘executive’ abstrac‐
tion-based system. We have attempted to un‐
pack each component of our framework. It is 
possible that future research will demonstrate 
that some components or processes may have 
to be broken down further, leading to an even 
more nested system. We agree with Dennett that 
the only way to ‘discharge fancy homunculi from 
one’s scheme [is] by organizing armies of such 
idiots to do the work’ (quoted in Monsell & Driver, 
2000, p.7). We believe that in order to under‐
stand how control is achieved, boxes have to be 
broken down until we understand how complex 
behaviour arises from a basic set of cognitive 
processes that can be implemented by our neu‐
ral system. One may object against this ‘decon‐
struction idea’ on the basis of parsimony: a mod‐
el with fewer components may seem more parsi‐
monious. However, this parsimony would only be 
achieved by attributing multiple powers to specif‐
ic controllers or control functions (Monsell & Driv‐
er, 2000), making the seemingly more parsimo‐
nious account equally complex.
Relation with other frameworks and models
As indicated in the text, our framework builds 
upon existing accounts of attention, control, 
working memory, and learning (e.g. Chein & 
Schneider, 2012; Deco & Rolls, 2005; Desimone 
& Duncan, 1995; Logan & Gordon, 2001; Miller & 
Cohen, 2001; Rougier et al., 2005). Consistent 
with these accounts, we postulate that the main 
role of the executive control system is to bias 
competition in subordinate processes via rules 
maintained in working memory (either in an ac‐
tive or silent mode). But we also propose that 
once the rules are implemented, the control sys‐
tem can take a back seat in many, if not most, 
situations, and action control may eventually 
become automatised. This overall framework is 
consistent with the ‘Learning and Control’ frame‐
work of Chein and Schneider (2012), who pro‐
posed that there are three systems: a meta-cog‐
nitive system, which supports rule learning, mon‐
itoring, and task sequencing (cf. hierarchical 
control); a cognitive control system, which sup‐
ports attention and action control; and a repre‐
sentation system, which supports associative 
learning. They also suggested that through prac‐
tice, the associative system will take over from 
the metacognitive and control systems, which is 
consistent with our ‘learned reflex’ idea.  
We believe that the main strength of our 
framework is that it integrates various theories 
and models, links findings, and points out simi‐
larities and differences between domains. This 
integration is a crucial step to enhance our un‐
derstanding of executive control and behavioural 
change.
Beyond action control
Many principles of our action control frame‐
work may translate to control in other domains, 
including emotion and control of thought. Several 
lines of evidence suggest a certain overlap be‐
tween control of action and control of thought 
and emotion. Action control and control of emo‐
tion and thought may also be coupled because 
changes in internal states (such as thoughts or 
an emotional reaction) could trigger changes in 
ongoing actions. Corbetta et al.’s review sug‐
gests that the ventral attention network, which is 
required for action control, might be involved in 
switching between aspects of ‘internal’ process‐
ing, such as memory retrieval or self-referential 
thoughts (Corbetta et al., 2008). Furthermore, 
brain areas that are important for action control, 
such as the right inferior frontal gyrus and the 
right middle frontal gyrus, may also regulate 
emotional memories (Depue, Curran, & Banich, 
2007) or unwanted thoughts (Benoit & Anderson, 
2012; Depue, Burgess, Willcutt, Ruzic, & Banich, 
2010). The overlap between action control and 
emotion regulation is further supported by corre‐
lations between rumination, inhibition and task 
switching (Whitmer & Banich, 2007). These and 
other similar findings have led several re‐
searchers to propose that similar control mecha‐
nisms may be required to regulate various as‐
EXECUTIVE CONTROL OF ACTIONS 19
pects of human behaviour (Aron, Robbins, & 
Poldrack, 2004; Banich et al., 2009; Cohen & 
Lieberman, 2010). Although speculative, this 
overlap could again be partly due to involvement 
of the abstract rule-like representations in vari‐
ous domains (‘do not think’, ‘do not respond’, 
….).  More generally, we believe that the main 
difference between domains may be in the con‐
tent controlled, not in the mechanisms by which 
control is achieved (see also Logan et al., 2013).
The work of Depue, Banich, and others sug‐
gest that emotion and executive control may 
influence each other. This link is further dis‐
cussed by Pessoa (2009), who proposed a dual-
competition framework to account for the effects 
of low- and high-threat emotional information on 
executive control. This framework can be inte‐
grated with our action control framework. More 
specifically, based on Pessoa’s framework we 
hypothesise that emotional content that is low in 
threat primarily interferes with attentional selec‐
tion; by contrast, high-threat information would 
interfere with action selection as well. We believe 
that this highlights one of the major benefits of 
our processing framework: by focusing on the 
specific mechanisms rather than the general 
functions, a richer and more detailed picture 
emerges. 
In a similar vein, one could use our frame‐
work to examine how motivation, mood, stress 
and other state-dependent factors influence ac‐
tion control and flexible behaviour. For example, 
animal studies have shown that the prefrontal 
cortex is modulated by neurotransmitter systems 
mediating stress and arousal (Arnsten, 2009; 
Robbins, 2007). The link between stress and 
action control is also demonstrated by the finding 
that people with addictions are prone to fail to 
suppress drug-seeking behaviour in stressful 
situations (Sinha, 2008). We hypothesise that 
acute stress could influence action control in at 
least three different ways: it could lead to a nar‐
rowed focus of attention (Chajut & Algom, 2003), 
it could discourage selection of alternative ac‐
tions (Goschke, 2000), or it could shift the bal‐
ance between rule-based and associatively-me‐
diated action control (Schwabe, Dickinson, & 
Wolf, 2011). Given the impact of state-dependent 
factors on behavioural change, a better under‐
standing of which processes are influenced by 
factors such as stress can again lead to the de‐
velopment of new interventions and improve‐
ments in existing ones. 
Conclusion
To conclude, we hope that this article will 
inspire research on action control, behavioural 
flexibility, and behavioural change to focus more 
on specific cognitive processes and representa‐
tions, how these can be learned throughout de‐
velopment and adulthood, and how these are 
maintained. We believe that this will lead to bet‐
ter models of executive control of action and 
behavioural change, which can inspire the devel‐
opment of new and more effective theory-driven 
interventions. Ultimately, this approach will allow 
us to banish homunculi from our theories. 
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Footnotes
1. The accumulation process is analogous to 
drawing a series of balls from an urn (Usher & 
McClelland, 2001). For example, the urn can 
contain balls with ’left’ or ’right’ written on them. 
At each time step in the response-selection pro‐
cess, a ball would be drawn, and a count is 
added to the appropriate counter (e.g. when a 
‘left’ ball is selected, a count is added to the left 
counter). A response is selected when one of the 
counters reaches a threshold. When the re‐
sponse threshold is 10, then a response is se‐
lected when 10 ‘left’ balls or 10 ‘right’ balls have 
been drawn from the urn. 
2. A quasi-experiment was subsequently con‐
ducted. The ‘prepared reflex’ idea was tested by 
either signalling or not signalling at this junction 
when a car was waiting to turn on another 20 
days, 10 signal, 10 no signal in alternation (this 
took about half a year). The results were that on 
50% of ‘signal’ occasions the car immediately 
turned. This never happened on ‘no-signal’ occa‐
sions.
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Appendix
Table 1: Overview of popular paradigms to study action control and behavioural flexibility. Definitions are based on the Cognitive Atlas project (Poldrack et al., 
2011). For more information about this project and other tasks, visit http://www.cognitiveatlas.org/. Note that this project also aims to increase the focus on the 
underlying processes. In the electronic version of this article, the task name is a hyperlink to the corresponding Cognitive Atlas page. 
Task name
Stop-signal task
Go/no-go task
Psychological refrac‐
tory period (PRP) 
task
Stroop task and vari‐
ants
The Eriksen flanker 
task
Manipulation
Participants usually perform a choice reaction time in which they have to respond as 
quickly as possible to a particular stimulus feature (e.g. colour, shape, identity, or 
location). On a minority of the trials, the go stimulus is followed by an additional 
signal (e.g. an auditory tone or a visual cue), which instructs participants to withhold 
their planned response. 
In the countermanding task, participants have to cancel a saccade towards a target 
when a fixation cross reappears. 
In the stop-change variant, participants have to cancel the planned manual response 
and execute an alternative response instead. 
Participants are instructed to respond as quickly as possible to go stimuli (e.g. 
letters) but to refrain from responding when a no-go stimulus is presented (e.g. a 
digit). Go events typically occur with higher frequency than no-go events. 
Participants are presented with two stimuli to which they have to respond. The 
interval between the two is usually so brief that the second stimulus appears before 
the response to the first one is finished.
In the Stroop task, colour words are presented in various ink colours. Participants are 
instructed to respond to the ink colour and ignore the words. In incongruent stimuli, 
colour names and ink colours are non-matching. Related tasks include the picture-
word naming task, in which words appear inside pictures of objects. 
A task in which participants view target stimuli to which they must make a simple 
lexical response. These stimuli are surrounded by flankers. Distracting flankers are 
typically associated with an opposite response (‘incongruent’), whereas facilitating 
flankers are typically associated with the same response as the target stimulus 
(‘congruent’).
Main dependent variable(s)
The stop-signal reaction time (SSRT), 
which is the estimated covert latency of 
stopping (Logan & Cowan, 1984). Longer 
SSRTs are usually interpreted to reflect 
poorer inhibitory control. 
The probability of responding on a no-go 
trial. 
Response latency of the second re‐
sponse (RT2), often as a function of the 
delay between the two stimuli (SOA). 
The PRP effect refers to the decrease in 
RT2 as SOA increases. 
The congruency effect, which refers to 
the difference between incongruent and 
congruent or neutral (e.g. ‘OOO’ written 
in red) stimuli. 
The congruency effect, which refers to 
the difference between incongruent and 
congruent items. 
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Task-switching 
paradigm
(Wisconsin) Card 
Sorting Test
Response-reversal 
learning
Participants frequently alternate between two or more tasks (e.g. naming the colour 
or identifying the shape of a stimulus). Which task they have to perform is often 
indicated by a cue (e.g. the task name or the location of the stimulus) or by a 
sequence they have to remember. 
The participant is presented with stimulus cards containing shapes. The cards differ 
in colour of the shapes, number of the shapes, and the form of the shapes. The 
participant is asked to sort these cards into two piles. The participant is not told what 
stimulus dimension to use in order to sort the cards, but feedback is provided to tell 
the participant if a particular match is correct. During the test, the sorting rules are 
changed and the participant must discover the new sorting rule in order to be 
successful. 
Participants first learn to respond to stimuli based on feedback, followed by a 
reversal of the stimulus-action mapping. Participants have to overcome the old 
(habitual) response, and instead, execute an alternative novel response. 
The difference between task-switch trials 
and task-repeat trials. Usually, switching 
from one task to another is slower and 
more error-prone than repeating the 
same task. 
The total number of categories achieved 
and the number of perseveration errors 
after a rule switch. 
Proportion of correct responses before 
and after the reversal stage. 
